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IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
EUGENE A. ANDERSON,
Pla~ntvff and

Respondent,

Case
-vs.-

No. 9396

KATHLEEN D. ANDERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal arises from an order entered by· the
lower court revising downward certain requirements with
regard to the payment of child support under an earlier
divorce decree. Plaintiff was awarded the divorce but
defendant was awarded the custody of the two minor
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children, subject to reasonable rights of visitation in
plaintiff. Plaintiff filed an order to show cause, seeking
custody, or, in the alternative, reduction in child support
payments. Custody was denied, but the child support
payments were reduced. From that reduction defendant
has appealed and plaintiff herewith responds, but plaintiff did not file a cross-appeal from the court's denial of
plaintiff's request for custody of the minor children.
Defendant, in her brief, has referred to appellant
and respondent by the letters "P" and "D", apparently
designating plaintiff and defendant, as the parties appeared in the court below. In order to achieve consistency
and clarity in identifying the parties on appeal, plaintiff
(respondent) will hereafter also use the designations
plaintiff and defendant'.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts appearing in defendant's
brief is, in the main, accurate. However, it is important
to note that plaintiff's Order to Show Cause not only
sought to obtain custody of the minor children, but, in the
alternative, sought modification of the support payments
reqUired by the earlier divorce decree (R. 64). The
Order to Show Cause required defendant to appear on
December 18, 1959 at 2:30p.m. (R. 64). Plaintiff's Motion
for the Order to Show Cause did not specifically identify
plaintiff's counsel, but attorney Rulon W. Clark of the
law firm of Clark and Clark notarized the verification of
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plaintiff (R. 63). Relying upon the hearing set for
December 28, counsel for plaintiff obtained a witness
from Las \r egas, who flew to Salt Lake City to give
testimony (T. 7). When plaintiff's counsel and plaintiff's 'vitnesses appeared in court for the hearing, it was
learned for the first time that the attorney for defendant
had obtained an ex parte continuance of the Order to
Show Cause without serving notice upon plaintiff or his
attorney (R. 67). Notice was given neither to Rulon W.
Clark, who notarized the verification, nor to plaintiff,
who signed the motion (R. 67). Thereupon, Judge Jeppson vacated the order of continuance to permit the perpetuation of testimony from the Las Vegas witness (R.
68), and the matter was then re-set for further hearing
on January 18, 1960, and was then continued to February
4, 1960 (R. 95).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
DISQUALIFY ITSELF.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NO·T ERR IN CONSIDERING AND
REDUCING SUPPORT PAYMENTS.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING COUNSEL
FEES TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
DISQUALIFY ITSELF.

The entire basis of the affidaVit of prejudice is that
Judge Jeppson vacated the ex parte order of oontinuance
when· he learned that plaintiff's counsel had produced a
witness from Las Vegas and had ·not received notice of
the order of continuance. As to this matter, as the affidavit shows, Judge Jeppson only provided for the perpetuation from the one witness from Las Vegas in order
. to avoid .the expense of bringing the witness to Utah a
second time. Since defendant's counsel obviously could
have given notice either to plaintiff directly or to attorney
Rulon W. Clark, it was no indication of prejudice to give
to defendant's counsel any of the three alternatives: (1)
To appear in court on December 18 and cross-examine
the witness; or (2) to fail to appear in court and waive
the right of cross-examination; or (3) Pay the transportation expense of the witness and the attorney's fee
of plaintiff's counsel by having the witness return for a
later hearing for cross-examination by defendant's counsel (R. 73~75). This· conduct is hardly_ indi~tive of prejudice.
Further, defendant's counsel waited ·until January
13 to file her affidavit of· prejudice (R. 75),. and -this
certainly was not as soo-n as "practicable" as: required
by Rule 63· (b), URCP. According to the rule,. the judge
need only certify the affidavit to another- judge when it
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is filed as '~soon a~ practicable" after counsel has learned
of the suspected bais or prejudice.
In any event, if any technical error was conrmitted, it
was hannless, and does not justify a reversal on appeal.
There is no foundation in fact for any of the bias and
prejudice alleged by defendant's counsel, and it is noteworthy that nothing appears in defendant's brief by way
of citation to the record to show that any error in this
regard was more than technical and harmless.

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CO·NSIDERING AND
REDUCING SUPPORT PAYMENTS.

Point No. II of defendant's brief contends that the
court erred in even considering education of support payments. But the issue was raised in plaintiff's motion for
an order to show cause (R. 62'), in the Order to Show
Cause (R. 64), and evidence was introduced relative to
that issue at the hearing (T. 90-92). It cannot reasonably
be argued that the court erred in considering reduction
of the support payments.
Point No. III of defendant's brief contends that the
court erred in reducing the support payments. This is
not so! It appeared from the testimony that plaintiff's
expenses had substantially increased between the time
of the earlier decree and the time of the hearing. wherein
the support payments were reduced. Plaintiff had borrowed an additional $1,000.00 to pay to defendant, was
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required to pay the utility, upkeep and related expense
on the house \\~hich defendant had theretofore lived in,
and was burdened by the increase in child support payrnents frorn $60.00 per child per month to $90.00 per
child per month (R ..90-92). Plaintiff's financial difficulty
in large part arose from the transaction involving the
house which the parties 'vere purchasing prior to their
divorce. It appeared at the time of the divorce that the
parties had an equity in the house, and defendant was
awarded the equity and was permitted to live in the
house. The divorce decree provided that the support payments which plaintiff was required to 1nake would increase 50% if the house were sold (R. 37), a11d when
defendant decided that the expense of maintaining the
house was more than she could bear, she transferred the
house to plaintiff, and plaintiff borrowed $1,000.00 to
pay to defendant, and, in addition to retiring this indebtedness, continued to pay the mortgage installments
on the house, began paying the utilities, maintenance and
upkeep, and assumed increased child support payments
from $120.00 per month to $180.00 per month. Since
plaintiff's take-home pay was only $260.00 per month,
plus $20.00 per month from U. S. Army Reserve drills,
Judge Jeppson found that the change in circumstances,
particularly the transactions relating to the house, justified reduction of. the support payments to $150.00 per
month for the two minor children.
The trial judge listened to the witnesses and considered the evidence. His findings with regard to a
material change in circumstance should not be upset on
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appeal unless there appears to be a serious abuse of
judicial disrretion. It is undeniable that there were
changes in plaintiff's financial circun1stances. It is
further undeniable that plaintiff is paying 54o/o of his
gross incorne for the support of t'vo minor children under
the reduced support pay1nents, and was paying over 64%
of his gross income for child support before the payments
were reduced. This is not such an abuse of discretion so
as to justify a reversal on appeal.

POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING COUNSEL
FEES TO DE·FENDANT'S ATTORNEY.

Defendant contends that the trial judge denied
counsel fees because he thought he was bound to do so
as a matter of law, but admits that the trial judge would
not sign findings and conclusions which recited that such
fees were denied as a matter of law (Appellant's Brief,
PP·, 14-15).
Plaintiff admits that the award or denial of counsel
fees is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the
trial court in matters of this kind, and within reasonable
limits it is not error to award or to deny such fees
(Marks v. Marks, 98 Utah 400, 100 P. 2d 207). But since
defendant's counsel had her opportunity to request attorney fees and to argue the law in support of her claim
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-15), and since the trial court
denied such request for fees after finding that plaintiff
was justified in seeking a reduction in support payments
(R. 109), and after the trial judge based his decision upon
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his sound judicial discretion, refusing to base it upon a
compulsory denial as a matter of law (Appellant's Brief,
p. 15), it must be assumed that the trial judge acted within
the permissible limits of his discretion.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff obtained an Order to Show Cause in an
effort to obtain custody of minor children when he had
reason to believe they were being badly neglected by
defendant, and only secondarily sought reduction in the
child support payments. After a full and fair hearing,
Judge Jeppson concluded that the circumstances were
not sufficient to warrant a change in the custody of the
children, but that the financial situation of plaintiff had
materially changed to his detriment so as to justify a
moderate reduction in child support payments. If any
error was committed at the trial level, which plaintiff
denies, it was inadvertent, inconsequential and harmless,
and does not justify a reversal on appeal. The evidence
amply supports the action of the trial court in reducing
the support payments, and it is respectfully submitted
that the judgment of the trial court should be affinned.
As a final note, plaintiff observes that defendant's
Point No. V on appeal assails the trial court for ordering
payment of costs after the filing by defendant of an affidavit of impecuniosity. Apparently the trial judge
thought the clerk of the court should have been paid the
costs out of the $1,000.00 which plaintiff paid to defendant
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for her equity in the house. While plaintiff is of the
opinion that the trial court was clearly. ·right in this
regard, the issue seems to be one between the District
Court and defendant, and it is difficult to see how plaintiff is a real party in interest with regard to this issue.
Therefore, plaintiff elects not to contest or argue the
merits of this issue on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

CLARK AND CLARK
By: Calvin E. Clark
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
1006 Deseret Building
Salt L·ake City, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

